

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 6241

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 8 SPC MEETING ON DETENTE: FRG PAPER

MISSION TRANSMITS BELOW GERMAN DELEGATION LIST OF QUESTIONS  
SUBMITTED DURING NOVEMBER 8 SPC DISCUSSIONS ON DETENTE  
(SEPTEL).

BEGIN TEXT

SUBJECT: QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE PREPARATION OF THE DISCUSSION  
ON DETENTE POLICY DURING THE AUTUMN MINISTERIAL MEETING

IN SEARCH FOR AN APPROPRIATE PREPARATION FOR A DISCUSSION  
AMONG FOREIGN MINISTERS ABOUT DETENTE POLICY, I SHOULD  
LIKE TO PUT FORWARD SOME IDEAS AND QUESTIONS. THIS STATE-  
MENT IS INTENDED TO BE AN INFORMAL ONE AND DOES NOT CLAIM  
TO BE EXHAUSTIVE.

1. WILL THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE LONG RUN, BE SATISFIED  
WITH A BALANCED MILITARY SITUATION, RENOUNCING A ONE-  
SIDED MILITARY SUPERIORITY? IS THERE A CHANGE IN SOME  
ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SOVIET DOCTRINE ACCORDING TO  
WHICH - SOVIET ARMAMENTS ONLY SERVE PEACE AND DETENTE AND  
THEREFORE THREATEN ON ONE"; MILITARY POWER IS EQUAL TO  
POLITICAL INFLUENCE, AND POLITICAL PRESSURE CAN BE EXERCISED  
ON THE BASIS OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY?

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2. THE SOVIET UNION IS TRYING TO PLACE PUBLIC OPINION  
BEFORE A SIMPLIFYING ALTERNATIVE: "DETENTE OR COLD WAR".  
SHOULD THE WEST NOT UNDERTAKE MORE INTENSIVE EFFORTS  
TO MAKE THE PUBLIC AWARE OF ITS MORE DIFFERENTIATED

DETENTE CONCEPT, WHICH CONSISTS OF A BROAD SCALE OF ACTIONS, STARTING WITH A BUSINESS-LIKE RELATIONSHIP THAT COULD DEVELOP INTO CLOSE COOPERATION IN ALL FIELDS?

3. ARE THE SOVIETS PREPARED TO CONCEDE THE STRICT OBSERVANCE AND FULL APPLICATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN? ARE THEY PREPARED TO ALLOW BERLIN TO BE TAKEN AS A YARDSTICK FOR THEIR RESOLUTION TO PURSUE DETENTE?

4. THE SOVIET UNION REJECTS THE SPREADING OF WESTERN IDEAS WITHIN ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE AS "ANTI-SOVIET" AND "INCOMPATIBLE WITH DETENTE" BUT EMPHASIZES AT THE SAME TIME THAT IT IS ENTITLED TO LAUNCH IDEOLOGICAL OFFENSIVES IN THE WEST AS PART OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE". IF THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINS ITS CONCEPT, SHOULD THE WEST NO INVERSELY INSIST ON A COMPETITION OF IDEAS IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD?

5. WHAT IS THE WESTERN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT ECONOMIC-TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION SHOULD NOT BE AMDE DEPENDENT ON POLITICAL CONDITONS?

IN VIEW OF THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ARMAMENTS POLICY: IS IT IN LINE WITH WESTERN INTEREST TO GRANT CREDITS AT REDUCED INTEREST RATES IN ADDITION TO THE ONE-SIDED TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGICAL KNOW-HOW FROM WEST TO EAST? OR SHOULD ECONOMIC EX-CHANGES TAKE PLACE ON A PURELY COMMERCIAL BASIS?

HAS THE ECONOMIC BALANCE SHIFTED IN FAVOUR OF THE EAST IN VIEW OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST OWING TO ENERGY, RAW MATERIAL, FINANCIAL AND EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS, AND DOES THIS REDUCE THE POSSIBLE LEVER EFFECT OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION FOR POLITICAL IMPROVEMENTS?

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6. THE PROMTION OF FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND INFORMATION IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF DETENTE POLICY FOR EUROPE. WHAT ARE THE POSSIBILITIES TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS IN THIS FIELD EVEN AFTER THE POSSIBLE CONCLUSION OF CSCE?

7. IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER'S ANALYSIS THAT DETENTE IS VITALLY IMPORTANT AS A CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO THE LATENT DANGER OF SELF-DESTRUCTION OF HUMANITY, AND THAT DETENTE CANNOT BE PURSUED SELECTIVELY IN ONE FIELD OR ONLY WITH REPECT TO A GROUP OF COUNTRIES, SPECIFIC INTERESTS OF THE

EUROPEAN STATES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION MUST BE

KEPT IN MIND. WILL THE SOVIET UNION BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE INCLUDING ALL ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASPECTS AND NOT TO ATTACK IT AS BEING "CONTRARY TO DETENTE"?

HOW CAN WE ENSURE THAT THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE COURSE OF DETENTE, RENOUNCES TO ITS LATENT HEGEMONIAL ASPIRATIONS CONCERNING WESTERN EUROPE?

8. WILL THE SOVIET AIM OF A EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY BE ADEQUATLY BALANCED BY THE ALLIANCE CONCEPT OF A REDUCTION OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION, ESPECIALLY BY MBFR?

9. THERE IS A DANGER THAT, AFTER THE END OF CSCE, THE SOVIET UNION WILL BRAND AS "REVANCHIST" AND "ANTI-DETENTE" GERMAN POLICY AIMED AT THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE GERMAN PEOPLE AND - ON THIS BASIS - AT REUNIFICATION. HOW CAN THE DANGER OF SUCH A ONE-SIDED INTERPRETATION BE AVOIDED?

10. THE MORE NUMEROUS THE CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BECOME, THE MORE STRONGLY SOVIET CONTROL OVER EASTERN EUROPE SEEMS TO BE DEVELOPING IN ORDER TO SCREEN OFF THEIR OWN PUBLIC AND THAT OF THEIR ALLIES AGAINST WESTERN INFLUENCES. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE WHICH MUST BE ATTACHED TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONFIDENTIAL

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SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS OF DETENTE POLICY, THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THERE ARE POSSIBILITIES FOR A CHANGE IN THE PRESENT FORM OF SOVIET HEGEMONY OVER EASTERN EUROPE. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT WOULD BE OF INTEREST TO DISCUSS THE PROSPECTS FOR A MODIFICATION OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DETENTE POLICY. IN THIS CONNECTION A STATEMENT IN CSCE-TEXTS SAYING THAT THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES HAVE TO APPLY BETWEEN ALL PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE SAME MANNER IRRESPECTIVE OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS, ALLIANCES ETC.

11. WHAT IS THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS ON THE DETENTE PROCESS WITH REGARD TO SOVIET EFFORTS TO GAIN INFLUENCE IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCES (FINLAND, YUGOSLAVIA, AUSTRIA)?  
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